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NOTES 
CRIMINAL LAW - THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND TURNS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
TO AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT-TO-PRIVACY 
ISSUE. Schochetv. State, 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to invention, necessity can be the mother of either 
enlightened or egregious appellate decisions, depending on one's view 
of judicial activism. As a result of Schochet v. State,l it is probably 
safe to say that a majority of the members of the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland view such judicial activism as enlightened. 
In Schochet, the court resorted to statutory construction to avoid 
a thorny constitutional right-to-privacy issue involving a private, 
consensual act of fellatio between an unmarried, heterosexual couple.2 
The practice of using statutory construction in such situations is 
common,3 but subjecting a statute to interpretation when its meaning 
appears obvious is not. 4 Nevertheless, the court decided that Mary-
land's perverted sexual practices statute, adopted in 1916 and appar-
ently all-encompassing, was subject to an interpretation removing 
consensual, noncommercial heterosexual acts of fellatio from its 
scope.5 
As a result of the court's creative approach, a young man's 
conviction for engaging in fellatio with a woman was overturned.6 
Most would agree that this is a meritorious result, especially since 
fellatio has become a common and widely accepted sexual practice. 7 
In fact, this is probably the reason the court applied statutory 
1. 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990). 
2. /d. 
3. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,212 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (acknowledging 
principle that "constitutional adjudication is to be avoided where it is fairly 
possible to do so without negating the intent of Congress"); Rescue Army v. 
Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) (expressing the Court's time-honored 
policy of "strict necessity in dealing with Constitutional issues"); see also cases 
cited infra notes 8-10. 
4. See infra notes 8-10. 
5. Schochet, 320 Md. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184. 
6. [d. at 735, 580 A.2d at 186. 
7. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
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construction in a situation that did not seem to call for it. Good 
intentions aside, the decision will enrage those who see it as judicial 
legislation. Although there is merit to this belief, the power of this 
argument is quelled by the minimal precedential impact of Schochet. 
In other words, the ends justify the means in Schochet, especially 
since the means employed did not create bad precedent. 
The questionable aspect of the court's analysis in Schochet was 
not the use of statutory construction to avoid the constitutional issue, 
but the use of an unreasonable construction. Courts often use stat-
utory construction to avoid constitutional issues. The general rule is 
that if there is more than one reasonable construction, those inter-
pretations avoiding constitutional questions are favored. 8 Some courts 
have extended this principle by holding that even a strained construc-
tion is desirable if it will save the constitutionality of a statute.9 
Maryland courts have not gone quite this far, but they have recog-
nized the principle that constitutional issues should be avoided through 
statutory interpretation, if reasonably possible. JO 
8. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) ("It is well settled that this 
Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided."); Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 93 (4th Cir.) (refusing 
to interpret a North Carolina statute because the statute was subject to an 
interpretation by a state court that would avoid or modify the constitutional 
question presented), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972); State v. One Certain 
Conveyance, 288 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Iowa 1980) (construing forfeiture of liquor 
conveyances to apply to conveyances used to transport drugs to avoid chance 
of forfeiture of property of an innocent title holder, which could create an 
equal protection violation); District Land Corp. v. Washington Suburban 
Sanitary Comm'n, 266 Md. 301, 312, 292 A.2d 695, 701 (1972) ("[W]here two 
constructions of statutory language are possible, the courts will prefer the 
construction [that saves the statute] rather than adopt one that will render it 
illegal and nugatory."); State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 421, 291 A.2d 
161, 165 (1972) ("If there are two reasonable constructions and one of them 
renders a statute of doubtful constitutionality, courts will adopt that view ... 
which establishes it free of fundamental constitutional objection. "). 
9. State v. Musto, 454 A.2d 449, 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) ("The 
duty of the court is to strain, if necessary, to save the act, not to nullify it."), 
a/I'd, 456 A.2d 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); cf. Kottsick v. Carlson, 
241 N.W.2d 842, 854 (N.D. 1976) (construing "custody" in adoption act so it 
has a different meaning than in a divorce proceeding or divorce decree). 
10. See Yangming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Revon Prods. U.S.A., Inc., 311 Md. 
496, 509-10, 536 A.2d 633, 640 (1986) (finding that, though it had an agent 
in Maryland who entered into contracts, a foreign corporation was not "doing 
business" in Maryland, because a determination that the corporation was 
"doing business" might undermine the federal constitution's Commerce Clause); 
In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966 (1983) (construing "parent" in a 
statute making parents financially liable for losses sustained as a result of the 
child's delinquent acts inapplicable to parents who did"llot actually have custody 
of the child at the time of the act, thereby avoiding possible conflicts with the 
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II. BACKGROUND 
For example, in Yangming Marine Transport Corp. v. Revon 
Products U. S.A., Inc., 11 the court was faced with interpreting a 
"closed-door" statute that prevented an unregistered or unqualified 
foreign corporation from suing in Maryland courtS.12 The statute 
provided that any foreign corporation "doing business" in Maryland 
must register with the state to maintain an action in Maryland 
courts.13 If "doing business" had been broadly construed, the plain-
tiff, an unregistered foreign corporation, might have been barred 
from bringing an action in Maryland courtS.14 The court construed 
the statute narrowly, however, finding that the corporation was not 
"doing business" in Maryland,15 The court reasoned that a broad 
interpretation of the statute might render it unconstitutional because 
it might violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. 16 
The court was reluctant to follow the Yangming analysis when 
the construction that would avoid a constitutional question was 
unreasonable. In O. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 17 
the court refused to narrow the definition of the phrase "beer 
distributor" and the word "franchisee" in the Beer Franchise Fair 
Dealing Act. IS The defendant, a beer distributor that also operated 
14th Amendment); Mangum v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 273 Md. 176, 
194, 328 A.2d 283, 293 (1974) (construing "obscenity" in movie censorship 
law narrowly in light of First Amendment requirements); cf Wilson v. Board 
of Supervisors of Elections, 273 Md. 296, 303, 328 A.2d 305, 310 (1974) 
(construing "public funds" to mean only the funds of Baltimore City in a 
proposed amendment to the city charter that prohibited the construction of 
any stadium in Baltimore with the use of public funds, thereby avoiding a 
conflict with state law). 
11. 311 Md. 496, 536 A.2d 633 (1986). 
12. Id. at 499, 536 A.2d at 634. 
13. Id. at 499 n.3, 536 A.2d at 634 n.3 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & 
ASS'NS § 7-301 (1985 & Supp. 1991». 
14. See Yangming, 311 Md. at 501-02, 536 A.2d at 635-36. 
15. Id. at 509, 536 A.2d at 640. 
16. Id. at 510, 536 A.2d at 640. The court stated: 
The Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that a "closed-
door" statute such as § 7-301 cannot, under the Commerce Clause, 
apply to unregistered or unqualified foreign corporations engaged in 
wholly interstate or foreign commerce. In light of the Supreme Court's 
opinions, it is questionable whether, under the Commerce Clause, § 
7-301 could validly be applied to bar this action by Yangming. 
Id. (citations and footnote omitted). 
17. 308 Md. 746, 521 A.2d 1225 (1987). 
18. Id. at 759, 521 A.2d at 1231-32. The Beer Franchise Fair Dealing Act is 
codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, §§ 203A-203G (1990). The Act seeks to 
deter beer manufacturers from inducing or coercing beer distributors into 
stimulating sales of beer products. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 203B (1990). 
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as a beer manufacturer, argued that it was not meant to be covered 
by the statute. 19 The court found, however, that the terms "beer 
distributor" and "franchisee" were clear, unambiguous and not 
subject to interpretation.2O The court concluded that the construction 
urged by the defendant was unreasonable, despite the possibility that 
the broad construction might run afoul of federal antitrust laws, and 
consequently violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution.21 
Before Schochet , statutory construction had never been invoked 
to avoid a constitutional question arising under Article 27, section 
554 of the Maryland Annotated Code - Unnatural and Perverted 
Sexual Practices.22 Most of the prosecutions under section 554 were 
for homosexual activity23 and sexual acts with minors.24 The only 
19. Heileman, 308 Md. at 755, 521 A.2d at 1230. 
20. Id. at 759, 521 A.2d at 1231-32. 
21. Id. at 763-64, 521 A.2d at 1234. The court said the narrow construction urged 
by the defendant was not permitted by the statutory language, and therefore 
it would not construe the statute in light of federal antitrust principles. Id. at 
764, 521 A.2d at 1234. 
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1992) provides in part: 
Every person who is convicted of taking into his or her mouth 
the sexual organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be 
convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in the mouth of any 
other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of committing any 
other unnatural or perverted sexual practice with any other person or 
animal, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), 
or be imprisoned . . . for a period not exceeding ten years, or shall 
be both fined and imprisoned within the limits above prescribed in 
the discretion of the court. 
23. See McKenzie v. State, 236 Md. 597, 204 A.2d 678 (1964) (involving adult 
male committing a perverted sexual act on the body of a minor boy); Bradbury 
v. State, 233 Md. 421, 197 A.2d 126 (1964) (involving adult male committing 
sodomy on a 12-year-old boy); Canter v. State, 224 Md. 483, 168 A.2d 384 
(1961) (per curiam) (committing buggery with another male); Jefferson v. State, 
218 Md. 397, 147 A.2d 204 (1958) (involving male school teacher committing 
act of perversion on a minor boy); Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 
414 (1957) (involving adult male committing sodomy with a 15-year-old boy); 
Gregoire v. State, 211 Md. 514, 128 A.2d 243 (1957) (convicting defendant of 
committing unnatural and perverted sexual practices on two young boys); Blake 
v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A.2d 273 (1956) (convicting defendant of committing 
unnatural and perverted sexual practice on feeble minded 19-year-old). 
24. See State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975) (convicting adult male 
of committing unnatural and perverted sex acts upon three young girls); 
McKenzie, 236 Md. 597, 204 A.2d 678 (involving adult male committing a 
perverted sexual act on the body of a minor boy); Bradbury, 233 Md. 421, 
197 A.2d 126 (involving adult male committing sodomy on a 12-year-old boy); 
Jefferson, 218 Md. 397, 147 A.2d 204 (involving male school teacher committing 
act of perversion on a minor boy); Saldiveri v. State, 217 Md. 412, 143 A.2d 
1991] Schochet v. State 143 
constitutional challenges made by the defendants in those cases were 
for overbreadth and vagueness, and the appellate courts treated those 
challenges rather cursorily. 2S In doing so, the appellate courts refused 
to apply narrow constructions to the broadly written statute. 26 
The first right-to-privacy challenge to section 554 came in Neville 
v. State,27 in which two defendants convicted of engaging in public, 
cpnsensual acts of fellatio contended that section 554 violated their 
right to privacy. 28 One defendant had committed the act in a shed 
visible from a path used by children attending a nearby school. 29 The 
other committed the act in a clearing in a small wooded area. 30 The 
court concluded that neither act could be considered private because 
both defendants had engaged in "intimate sexual actIvity during 
daylight hours in a place which was out of doors, which was in a 
well populated community, and which was equally as accessible to 
uninvited other persons as it was to [them]. "31 
As a result of its holding, the court avoided the right-to-privacy 
claims raised by the defendants. The court did find, however, after 
an analysis of the Supreme Court's recognition of the right to privacy, 
"that there is no holding by the Supreme Court that the right of 
privacy applies to conduct of the type prohibited" by section 554.32 
Therefore, the dicta in Neville indicated that section 554 would indeed 
prohibit unmarried couples from engaging in noncommercial, private 
acts of fellatio. 
The majority of states deciding the right-of-privacy issue raised 
by the defendants in Neville and Schochet agree with the dicta in 
Neville. At least nine states other than Maryland have considered the 
issue, and in all but one of those nine cases the decisions were based 
70 (1958) (convicting adult male of committing unnatural and perverted sexual 
act with an 8-year-old girl); Taylor, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 414 (involving 
adult male committing sodomy with a 15-year-old boy); Gregoire, 211 Md. 
514, 128 A.2d 243 (convicting defendant of committing unnatural and perverted 
sexual practices on two young boys). 
25. See cases cited supra notes 23-24. 
26. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A.2d 273 (1956) (holding § 554 
not limited to acts of oral perversion); Edmonds v. State, 18 Md. App. 55, 
305 A.2d 205 (1973) (classifying anal passage as a sexual organ within the 
meaning of § 554 and upholding conviction for inserting broom handle in 
rectum as a violation of § 554). 
27. 290 Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 (1981). 
28. Id. at 366, 430 A.2d at 571. The court of appeals consolidated the defendants' 
cases because they presented the same issues of right of privacy and equal 
protection. Id. 
29. Id. at 369-70, 430 A.2d at 572-73. 
30. Id. at 370-71, 430 A.2d at 573. 
31. Id. at 378-79, 430 A.2d at 577. 
32. Id. at 377, 430 A.2d at 576. 
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on constitutional grounds involving either an interpretation of the 
scope of the right to privacy, or an equal protection analysis. 33 Five 
states found no right-to-privacy violation,34 three found a right-to-
privacy violation,3S and one found that its statute violated the equal 
protection clause. 36 Massachusetts avoided any constitutional conflicts 
by interpreting its statute narrowly to exclude acts by unmarried 
adultsY None of the other nine state courts, even though they had 
statutes similar to Massachusetts', ever mentioned the possibility of 
interpreting their statutes to avoid a constitutional conflict.38 
In the Massachusetts decision Commonwealth v. Balthazar,39 the 
state's highest court held a statute preventing the commission of 
33. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
34. The five states are Arizona, Indiana, New Mexico, North Carolina and Rhode 
Island. See State v. Bateman, 547 P .2d 6 (Ariz.) (holding that the right of 
privacy is not unqualified and the legislature has the power to prohibit sodomy 
and other lewd and lascivious acts without offending that right), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 864 (1976); Dixon v. State, 268 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1971) (holding that, 
even assuming the act of cunnilingus was consensual, the defendant's conviction 
did not violate the federal constitutional right of privacy); State v. Elliot, 551 
P.2d 1352 (N.M. 1976) (holding sodomy statute constitutional as applied to 
male for engaging in act with female, even if the act was consensual); State v. 
Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that constitutional right of 
privacy does not protect an adult male from being prosecuted for engaging in 
private, consensual act of fellatio with an adult female), cert. denied, 259 
S.E.2d 304 (N.C. 1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 947 (1980); State v. Santos, 
413 A.2d 58 (R.1. 1980) (holding that, even though the heterosexual conduct 
of the adults occurred in private, the constitutional right of privacy is inap-
plicable to private unnatural copulation between unmarried adults). 
35. The three states are New Jersey, New York and Oklahoma. See State v. 
Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977) (finding that state fornication statute 
violated federal and state constitutional right of privacy when applied to males 
engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with unmarried women); People v. 
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (finding statute violated right of privacy 
when applied to deviant sexual conduct performed voluntarily by adults in a 
private noncommercial setting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Post v. 
State, 715 P.2d 1I05 (Okla. Crim. App.) (finding that right of privacy, as 
formulated by the Supreme Court, includes the right to select consensual adult 
sex partners), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986). 
36. Pennsylvania is the lone state to base its decision on equal protection grounds. 
See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (holding that statute 
making deviate acts criminal only when performed between unmarried persons 
exceeds proper bounds of police power and violates the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
37. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 480-81 (Mass. 1974); see also 
Commonwealth v. Hill, 385 N.E.2d 253 (Mass. 1979) (supporting the construc-
tion of the statute applied in Balthazar). 
38. See cases cited supra notes 34-36. It is unlikely that any of the courts upholding 
their perverted sex acts statutes would have attempted to limit the scope of 
the statutes through statutory construction because such an approach would 
have resulted in an acquittal of the defendant. 
39. 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974). 
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"unnatural and lascivious acts with another person" to be "inappli-
cable to private, consensual conduct of adults."40 The court reached 
this conclusion after determining that the Supreme Court's adoption 
of the right of privacy articulated a "constitutional right of an 
individual to be free from government regulation of certain sex-
related activities. "41 This, coupled with tlie court's finding that com-
munity values on the subject of permissible sexual conduct were no 
longer monolithic, permitted the court to read its statute as prohib-
iting only sexual conduct disapproved of by the community. 42 It was 
unnecessary for the court to decide if "a statute which explicitly 
prohibits specific sexual conduct, even if consensual and private, 
would be constitutionally infirm. "43 Massachusetts was alone in its 
method of dealing with the constitutional challenge to its perverted 
sexual acts statute until it was joined by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Schochet v. State. 44 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
The petitioner in Schochet, Steven Adam Schochet, was indicted 
in Montgomery County for rape and various sex offenses, including 
engaging in an act of fellatio in violation of section 554.45 Conflicting 
versions of the facts giving rise to the charges were presented at 
trial.46 The jury, believing Schochet's version, acquitted him on the 
40. [d. at 481. 
41. [d. at 480-81. 
42. [d. at 481. 
~.M , 
44. 320 Md. 714, 731, 580 A.2d 176, 184 (1990). 
45. [d. at 717-18, 580 A.2d at 177-78. Schochet was charged with first degree rape, 
second degree rape, first and second degree sexual offenses, sodomy, and 
committing an unnatural and perverted sexual act. [d. 
46. Victim Dovie Sullivan's testimony, as related by the court of appeals, is 
summarized as follows: She had put her ll-year-old daughter to bed and was 
celebrating her divorce when Schochet knocked on her door. She let him in to 
use the telephone and he began to make himself at home. She asked him to 
leave, but he refused. She did not scream or try to get help because her 
daughter was asleep and she feared for her daughter's safety as well as her 
own. Even though Schochet had no weapons and made no overt threats, he 
forced her to perform fellatio and have vaginal and anal intercourse. The next 
morning she ordered Schochet to leave and he complied. A few hours later he 
returned, accusing her of giving him "crabs" and demanding money so that 
he could see a doctor. Police later came by her apartment to ask questions 
about a report of an abused child. The officers left a telephone number which 
she later called and reported the events of the previous night. Schochet, 320 
Md. at 719-20,580 A.2d at 178-79. 
Schochet's testimony, as related by the court of appeals, is summarized 
as follows: On the night of the incident, Schochet was looking for a party in 
Dovie Sullivan's apartment building. Hearing loud music coming from one of 
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sex offense and rape charges, but found him guilty of engaging in 
fellatio.47 
Schochet appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
arguing that section 554 was unconstitutional as applied to private 
and noncommercial sexual acts between consenting, heterosexual 
adults.48 A divided court affirmed, holding that no constitutional 
protection for sexual activity existed outside of marriage. 49 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and heard 
oral arguments.50 The court, sua sponte, added the following issue 
and ordered a reargument: 
As a m~tter of statutory construction, and considering the 
principle that if reasonably possible courts will construe a 
statute so as to avoid a serious constitutional question, does 
Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 554, 
encompass consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity 
between adults in the privacy of the home?51 
IV. REASONING AND ANALYSIS 
The court answered no,52 and as a result circumvented Schochet's 
right-to-privacy claim.53 The court employed a three step analysis to 
arrive at its holding. First, it emphasized the canon of statutory 
construction providing that if a legislative act is susceptible of two 
reasonable interpretations, the construction that avoids the determi-
nation of constitutionality is preferredY Second, by citing decisions 
from other jurisdictions, the court showed the complexity of the 
right-to-privacy issue and the lack of uniformity in the holdings of 
other courtS.55 The court concluded: "We express neither agreement 
the apartments, he thought he had found the party so he knocked on the 
door. Sullivan invited him in and fixed him a drink. She then performed 
fellatio on him and invited him into the bedroom where they had consensual 
vaginal intercourse. He went home the next morning and discovered he had 
"crabs." He returned to Sullivan's apartment and asked her to take him to a 
doctor and pay for his examination and treatment. She refused. In retaliation 
he called the police and falsely reported that Sullivan was abusing her daughter. 
Id. at 720-21, 580 A.2d at 179. 
47. Id. at 723, 580 A.2d at 180. 
48.Id. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 724-25, 580 A.2d at 181. 
51. Id. at 725, 580 A.2d at 181. 
52. Id. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184. 
53. Id. at 717, 580 A.2d at 177. 
54. Id. at 725, 580 A.2d at 181. 
55. Id. at 726-28, 580 A.2d at 181-83. 
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nor disagreement with any of the above cited cases. We simply point 
out that the approximately even division among appellate courts 
reinforces our conclusion that the constitutional issue here presented 
is a very difficult one. "56 In the first two steps, the court established 
that statutory construction was a proper means to avoid deciding a 
difficult constitutional question. It was then free to invoke this 
solution if it found section 554 was subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation. 
The court did this in its third step when it concluded that section 
554 was broad and sweeping, and that its "silence concerning the 
matters of consent, privacy, marriage, etc., creates legitimate ques-
tions regarding the reach of the statute. "57 It then analogized to 
previous decisions in which it had construed statutes narrowly to 
avoid constitutional issues, concluding that "the broad, nonspecific 
language of Art. 27, Section 554, is subject to a limiting construction 
in order to avoid a substantial constitutional issue.' '58 
The court buttressed its holding by pointing to its previous 
decisions regarding. section 554.59 Because none of these decisions 
involved a prosecution based on consensual, noncommercial, heter-
osexual activity between adults in private, the court reasoned that 
there "is a strong indication that such conduct is not within the 
contemplation of Section 554."60 
56. [d. at 728, 580 A.2d at 183. 
57. [d. at 729, 580 A.2d at 183. 
58. [d. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184. 
59. [d. at 731-34, 580 A.2d at 184-85; see supra notes 23-32 and accompanying 
text. 
60. Schochet, 320 Md. at 734, 580 A.2d at 185. In the fifth section of the opinion 
the court rejected the State's argument regarding the legislative history of 
Chapter 573 of the 1976 Acts of Maryland (now codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, §§ 461-464E). [d. at 734-35, 580 A.2d at 185-86. Chapter 573 divided 
the offense of rape into first degree rape and second degree rape, and enacted 
new sexual offenses in the first degree through the fourth degree. [d. at 734, 
580 A.2d at 186. Subject to exceptions for minors, the mentally defective, and 
the physically incapacitated, the statute "require[s] proof that the act was 
'against the will and without the consent of the other person.'" [d. 
It was originally intended that Chapter 573 replace § 554; however, the 
bill was amended to leave § 554 intact. Schochet, 320 Md. at 734-35, 580 A.2d 
at 186. The State argued that because Chapter 573, which only concerned 
nonconsensual sex crimes, did not repeal § 554, the legislature must have 
intended that § 554 encompass consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity 
between adults in private. [d. at 735, 580 A.2d at 186. The court rejected this 
argument, stating that the legislature may have decided that "consensual 
homosexual acts should still be prohibited, or that consensual sexual acts in 
non-private places ... should remain criminal." [d. 
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The court's reasoning stretched the principles of statutory con-
struction. The court did not find that section 554 was subject to 
more than one reasonable interpretation, but that the constitutionality 
of section 554 is debatable. As Chief Judge Murphy argued in dissent, 
"that there may be a significant division throughout the country as 
to the constitutionality of statutes similar to § 554 provides no basis 
to conclude that the language of the Maryland statute lends itself to 
more than one reasonable interpretation. "61 
On its face, section 554 appears all inclusive. It criminalizes 
unnatural or perverted sexual acts, describes such acts, yet it provides 
no exceptions from the prohibited conduct. 62 It does not distinguish 
between "commercial and noncommercial sexual activity, public from 
private, homosexual from heterosexual, married from unmarried, or 
adult from juvenile activity. "63 Although broadly written, the appel-
late courts had previously determined that section 554 is neither 
overbroad64 nor vague.65 
Moreover, there is no legislative history that sheds any light on 
the intent of the Maryland General Assembly when it passed section 
554 in 1916.66 The subsequent amendments to the section also provide 
little assistance in determining the legislative intent.67 In light of this, 
61. [d. at 736, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
62. [d. at 736-37, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting); see also supra note 
22. 
63. Schochet, 320 Md. at 736-37, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
64. See Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 264-66, 306 A.2d 634, 641-42 (1973) 
(holding that the term "lewdness" in a prostitution statute cannot be vague 
or overbroad since unnatural and perverted sexual practices as defined by § 
554 are not vague or overbroad); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 504-05, 
287 A.2d 299, 304 (1972) (holding that as it is almost inconceivable that private 
consensual acts between married couples would be prosecuted under § 554, the 
statute does not extend to or infringe upon their privacy rights). 
65. See Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 462, 124 A.2d 273, 274 (1956) (holding that 
§ 554 is not vague and uncertain, explaining that it is impossible to define 
some types of crime with a detailed description of all possible cases that may 
arise); see also Hughes, 14 Md. App. at 507, 287 A.2d at 306 (holding that 
failure to specify an age at which a minor may consent to engage in perverted 
sexual practices with an adult does not render § 554 unconstitutional). 
66. Section 554, introduced as Senate Bill 565, was enacted by the Maryland 
General Assembly in 1916. Law of Apr. 18, 1916, ch. 616, 1916 Md. Laws 
1293. Neither the title nor the purpose clause of Senate Bill 565 indicate that 
unmarried heterosexuals would be excluded from its scope. See id. 
67. Section 554 was amended in 1976 as part of the comprehensive revision of 
Maryland's sexual offense laws. Law of May 17, 1976, ch. 573, 1976 Md. 
Laws 1258. The legislative history of the amendment shows that the statute 
was intended to apply to consensual, noncommercial heterosexual and homo-
sexual conduct. [d. It is unclear, however, whether the statute was intended to 
apply to such activity when it occurs in private. [d. 
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the preferred approach to interpreting section 554 is to follow its all-
encompassing plain meaning.68 
This was the method chosen by the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the state, both of whom concluded that a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute required the inclusion of acts between 
unmarried heterosexuals.69 The majority disregarded these arguments 
and found that the statute, because of its broad and sweeping 
language, is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.70 
This conclusion is unreasonable and ignores the plain meaning 
of the statute.71 Furthermore, it assumes that in 1916 the Maryland 
General Assembly intended to exclude some unnatural and perverted 
sexual acts even though 1916 was "a staid time in our history when 
the sexual mores of the people were far less tolerant than the moral 
attitudes that prevail in today's society."72 
Despite this dubious rationale, there is merit to the Schochet 
opinion. An appreciation of the opinion lies not in its legal analysis, 
68. This approach is commonly referred to as the plain meaning rule. See United 
States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 217 (1920) ("[I]n the construc-
tion of a law, its meaning must first be sought in the language employed. If 
that be plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce the law as written .... "); 
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 913 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Statutory 
construction properly begins with examination of the literal language of a 
statute, and it properly ends there unless the language is ambiguous or would, 
as literally read, contravene a clearly expressed legislative intention."); Brodsky 
v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98, 570 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990) ("In construing a 
statute [the court] assumes that the words of the statute are intended to have 
their natural, ordinary and generally understood meaning in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary."); Kindley v. Governor of Maryland, 289 Md. 620, 
625, 426 A.2d 908, 911 (1981) ("[When] a statute is phrased in broad general 
terms, it suggests that the legislature intended the provision to be capable of 
encompassing circumstances and situations which did not exist at the time of 
its enactment. "). 
69. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 2, Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 
580 A.2d 176 (1990) (No. 88-76) (arguing that the statute unambiguously 
applies to consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in 
the privacy of the home); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Maryland, Inc. at 9, Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 
(1'990) (No. 88-76) (arguing that § 554 has clearly been understood over the 
years to apply to sexual acts between consenting adults regardless of sexual 
orientation). But see Petitioners' Supplemental Brief at 3, Schochet v. State, 
320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990) (No. 88-76) (arguing that § 554 may be 
reasonably interpreted not to encompass consensual, noncommercial heterosex-
ual activity between adults in the privacy of the home). 
70. See Schochet, 320 Md. at 728-31, 580 A.2d at 183-84. 
71. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text; see also Maryland State Bd. of 
Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 505, 312 A.2d 216, 221 (1973) 
(declining to construe statute regulating cosmetologists in such a way so as to 
avoid the determination of a constitutional issue because it would produce a 
strained construction of the statute). 
72. Schochet, 320 Md. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
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but in the way the court extricated itself from precedent that seem-
ingly dictated an affirmance of Schochet's conviction, and overturned 
his conviction without creating bad precedent. 
If the court had decided Schochet on the right-to-privacy issue 
presented, Schochet's conviction would likely have been affirmed. 
Not only was this indicated by the dicta in Neville,73 but it was the 
result reached by Judge Moylan after a thorough analysis of Supreme 
Court opinions defining the right of privacy when Schochet was 
before the court of special appeals.74 Judge Moylan concluded that 
"[t]here is not the remotest allusion to any constitutional protection 
for sexual activity - orthodox or unorthodox, heterosexual or ho-
mosexual - at least outside of marriage. "75 The scope of his inquiry 
did not concern the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it 
contains no express or implied right of privacy. 76 
Still, the court of appeals could have disregarded Judge Moylan's 
influential opinion77 and justified overturning Schochet's conviction 
by following other jurisdictions. Three other states had previously 
73. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
74. The Maryland court noted that the scope of the right of privacy and the 
limitations upon the right are found in five Supreme Court decisions. Schochet 
v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 322, 541 A.2d 183, 186-87 (1988). The five cases 
are: Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the constitutional 
right of privacy does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(holding that the constitutional right of privacy guaranteed adults access to 
contraceptives and that a New York law forbidding anyone but a licensed 
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives was an unconstitutional infringement 
on that right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding, as an aspect of the 
right of privacy, the constitutional right for an unmarried woman to choose 
whether to continue or abort her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972) (striking down as unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that made 
it a crime to dispense contraceptive drugs or articles to unmarried persons); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4.79 (1965) (criminalizing the prescribing of. 
any contraceptive drug device to married couples violates the zone of privacy 
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees). 
75. Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 339, 541 A.2d 183, 195 (1988). 
76. [d. at 317, 541 A.2d at 184; see Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 371 n.5, 430 
A.2d 570, 574 n.5 (1981) (noting that the appellant's privacy right arguments 
were based upon the federal constitution, not upon Maryland's Constitution 
or Declaration of Rights); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 512, 
336 A.2d 97, 104 (1975) ("It is, of course, no longer open to question that 
the right of privacy is protected by the federal constitution .... "); Doe v. 
Commander, Wheaton Police Dep't, 273 Md. 262, 269, 329 A.2d 35, 40 (1974) 
("Government . . . conduct . . . that clearly invades individual privacy ... 
cannot be permitted unless a compelling public necessity has been clearly 
shown."). 
77. See United States v. Fagg, 33 M.J. 618, 622 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991) (James, J., 
dissenting) (stating that Judge Moylan's opinion "so well states my views that 
I cannot improve upon its analysis"), rev'd, 34 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1992). 
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found statutes similar to section 554 to violate the federal constitu-
tional right of privacy when applied to private, adult, consensual, 
noncommercial, heterosexual deviant or perverted activities. 78 All of 
these opinions, however, pre-dated the Supreme Court's 1986 decision 
in Bowers v. Hardwick. 79 In Bowers, the Supreme Court refused to 
expand the scope of the constitutional right of privacy in holding 
that it did not extend to adult, consensual acts by unmarried persons 
even in the privacy of the bedroom.8o In the wake of this restriction, 
it would have been difficult for the court to justify a holding based 
on pre-Bowers decisions.8! 
So, if the court had decided the right-to-privacy issue it was 
almost forced to follow Judge Moylan'S opinion. Although that 
opinion is consistent with precedent, its result is inapposite with 
contemporary values. Reports on sexual behavior of adults over the 
last fifty years have shown a growing number of people engaging in 
cunnilingus and fellatio. 82 Even Judge Moylan suggested that there 
78. See cases cited supra note 35. 
79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see cases cited supra note 35. 
80. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
81. When the three states found that their unnatural and perverted sexual act 
statutes violated the federal constitutional right of privacy, the Supreme Court 
had just begun to map out the limits of the right of privacy in intimate 
relationships. In 1976, the Supreme Court began to restrict the right of privacy 
by summarily affirming a three judge panel of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia which held that there was no authoritative 
judicial bar to the proscription of homosexuality since it is not a part of 
marriage, home or family life. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of 
Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), a/I'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
Because Doe was a summary opinion it was not treated with the same 
precedential authority as a plenary opinion. See Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 718 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Doe established a precedent that the majority should not be permitted to 
ignore). It was not until Bowers affirmed what was suggested in Doe that 
strong precedent limiting the right of privacy was established. 
82. In his 1948 report, Alfred Kinsey found that fewer than half of the men 
interviewed engaged in fellatio or cunnilingus, even during marriage. ALFRED 
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 368 (1948). However, 
in the category of highest incidence - married men with 13 plus years of 
education - 45.3070 performed cunnilingus and 42.7% engaged in fellatio. Id. 
Five years later, Kinsey reported that 54% of the married women interviewed 
had engaged in pre-coital cunnilingus and 49% had engaged in fellatio. ALFRED 
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 399 (1953). In a 
1977 Redbook Report on Female Sexuality, two researchers found that 92.7% 
of wives responding reported having engaged in cunnilingus and 90.9% had 
engaged in fellatio. CAROL TAVRIS & SUSAN SADD, THE REDBOOK REpORT ON 
FEMALE SEXUALITY 162-63 (1976). From their responses, they concluded, "[t]oday 
it is clear that if the sexual revolution has occurred anywhere, it is in the 
practice and acceptance of oral sex. Among people under age twenty-five, it 
is virtually a universal part of the sexual relationship." Id. at 87. 
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has been a massive sexual revolution in the last quarter of this 
century and that modes of sexual expression once thought to be 
perverted or unnatural may now be a common experience of Amer-
icans.83 Therefore, the constitutional issue presented by Schochet 
forced the court to either affirm the conviction of Schochet for 
engaging in an accepted sexual practice, or acknowledge modern 
values and expand the right of privacy in a way not yet sanctioned 
by the Supreme Court. 
Statutory construction provided an easier way out. That route 
created a result in harmony with modern sexual practices without 
wandering into areas of the right of privacy not yet chartered by the 
Supreme Court. The court played loosely with statutory construction, 
but this is not egregious because the holding will have little prece-
dential effect on statutory construction principles.84 Also, the effect 
on section 554 is the same as if the case had been decided on right-
to-privacy grounds. It is now interpreted to exclude the private, 
noncommercial, consensual unnatural or perverted sexual practices 
of unmarried heterosexuals, just as it would have been if the court 
had decided that the private, consensual, noncommercial acts of 
unmarried heterosexuals enjoy a constitutional protection under the 
right of privacy. 
This result leaves the court open to criticism for legislating from 
the bench. It ignored the plain meaning of the statute and imposed 
a restricting construction despite having no supportive legislative 
history. In short, the court imposed its own belief of what is and 
what is not an unnatural and perverted sexual act. Although many 
would argue that any act of judicial legislation should never be 
condoned,85 the circumstances of Schochet present two strong argu-
ments for overlooking the legislative liberties taken by the court. 
First', Schochet has very little precedential impact. 86 It is the only 
83. Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 350, 541 A.2d 183, 200-01 (1988). Chief 
Judge Murphy in his dissent in the Court of Appeals of Maryland decision 
said he shared Judge Moylan's observation that there has been a massive sexual 
revolution in the last 25 years. Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 738, 580 A.2d 
176, 187 (1990) (Murphy, C.l., dissenting). 
84. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. Because the court did strain to 
use statutory construction, Schochet could be seen as adopting the principle 
that even a strained construction is desirable if it will uphold constitutionality. 
See supra note 9 and accompanying text. However, the court never clearly 
stated that it had adopted this view. 
85. "[I]t is not the function of this Court to decide cases on the basis of community 
standards." Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 352, 541 A.2d 183, 202 
(1988) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530-31 (1965) (Black, 
J., dissenting». The courts are to decide cases agreeably to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, and it is the legislature's job to take a law off 
the books. Id. at 352-53, 541 A.2d at 202. 
86. See supra note 84. 
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case reaching the appellate level in the 74-year history of section 554 
that has involved a private, noncommercial, heterosexual act between. 
consenting adultsY It is unlikely that anyone will escape prosecution 
or conviction from section 554 because of the new interpretation of 
the statute. Second, a sense of justice dictates the court's ruling. It 
was the least offensive manner in which the court could overturn 
Schochet's conviction88 for engaging in a widely accepted and prac-
ticed sexual act. 
v. CONCLUSION 
In Schochet, the Court of Appeals of Maryland showed a 
willingness to engage in judicial activism by applying questionable 
reasoning to established principles to achieve what most would per-
ceive as an equitable outcome. The result is a case with little prece-
dential effect, thereby almost entirely limiting any judicial rights or 
wrongs it committed to Schochet alone. 
Thomas F. McKeon 
87. See cases cited supra notes 23-32. 
88. There were two other methods the court of appeals could have chosen to 
overturn Schochet's conviction. It could have decided that the constitutional 
right of privacy prohibited his conviction. The court might also have read a 
right of privacy into the Declaration of Rights of Maryland - something 
which the court has never done. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
See also Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 363, 541 A.2d 183, 207 (1988) 
(Wilner, J., dissenting). ("I therefore do not suggest (and indeed would oppose) 
grounding this right [to privacy) solely on the State Constitution. "). 
